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Brown v. Chote ~ .,-'-I.,~ ~ ~ ~--_..,,..c&••«~. 
App. from three jdgek court-ND Cal.--(Hamlin, Womlenberg, Swelgert) 
-- ------------ Hamlin dissentin~. 
Resp. was a candidate for Congress in California. Rxsxxk~ Cal. -
law required that a fee of $425 must be paid in advance sf to entitle 
resp. to a place on the ballot for the June primary election. That same - -
law provides that in every election, that a fee payable to the Sec-
retary of State f~x for filing a declaration of candidacy shall be 
1% of the first year's salary for xkxxxsffxEe the office sol!$ht, in 
~ " 
resµ. case $425. Res~. alleged he was an indigent, E~x:i:ax could not xffs 
afford the fee and that the filing fee requirement xxs:i:xxea discrim-
inated against indigents and axxx x disadvantaged persons in violation 
of the equal portection clause . The three judge court upheld his claim 
to the extent of issuing a preliminary injunction ~:gia.iu~x£~xxxi~ 
E:i: 
fExkiia forbidding Cal. from collecting the fee for the primary. From 
this judgment Cal . appeals. 
In i ts opinion t he three ja ja«gR judge court relied heavily on 
which you will remember i: x was kXRE handed down 
by this Court in February. In ~ul~ock, the Supreme Court struck down 
as vio1-ati.ve of the equal -protection «i:xi: clause a Texas election 
filing fee x~xxR~ system where fees ranged from $150 to as high as 
$8900. The court below noted that in the instant case as in ~~llo~~, 
the state made no showj_ng of some alternative method whereby a can-
didate who is unable to pay the filing fee can get on the ballot either 
by nominating petition, primary election or pauper's affidavit. The 
court further noted that the statute did not even tie the filing fee to 
c..,s .... 1~~1 ol- tA.t J 
election costs or the cost of filing but arbitrarily to the office 
sought. The court below found the same discrimination against indigents 
as in Bullock xk and ventured that all state filing R fees had to be 
governed by a compeeli.ng state interest test used in Harper(the poll 
tax case) Rand not by a milder rational basis t ~st. --
California disputes the majorities approach. g Petrs note 
that there is language in Bulloc~ which Rmtt-kxix emphasizes that "nothing 
herein is ~ended to cast doubt on the xxxi:i: validity of reasonable 
candidate filing fees or licensing fees in other contexts." The kxxi: 
I 
above 1. anguage was 
REXki:R~ no showing 
the basis for Judge Hamlin's dissent which noted that 
had been made that the Cal. fee was unreasonable. 
The unfortunate thing is that Bullock is an« ambiguous decis-
ion which leaves room for differing interpretations on ..t.atc ii?isj ice,; 
DiEkXEXXEl 
,. 
the validity of state filing fees which of course happened in the court 
below. However, I would say that the majority's interpretation finds 
more support in Bullock than Judge Hamlin's dissent. The fact that 
no alternative menas of getting on the ballot is provmded by 
fee is great.er than some of those in 
I 
Cal . .S a tough case. As a matter of 
But I would say that state filing fees can represent quite 
' legitimate state interests, including defraying the costs of filing and 
exEexxsxxxaxs costs of elections as well as x:imxxxgxax½sxxs£ keeping 
the number of candidates onx the ballot to a reasonable number. Thus, 
I would favor a rule which would allow state filing fees of less than 
outrageous amounts. But it would be unwi~to rexamine Bul_lock so soon 
a£zezz:i;zsz!' 
and until the time comes to draw back on that decison, I would 
AFFIRM JHW 
No. 71-6852 
Lubin v . Alliason 
Cert to Cal. Sup. Ct. 
DISCUSS 
Petr asks that the Registrar of Los Angeles County be required 
to process his nomination papers for his candidacy for the Board 
of Suuervisors without payment of the $700 £ix filing fee. He claims 
indigency and that the £i.xi.n£x:e.x filing fee xi.sax violates the rights' 
of indigents under the equal protection clause. I have discussed this 
question at length in my cert note a£ on Brown v. Chote, No. 71-1583. 
The RH questions are substantially i.a:e.ni.xERX identical. 
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No. 71-6852 
•.• f . 
10/12/72--LAH 
/IEJ-IJ tS 
No. 71-1583 OT 1972 
Brown v. Chote 
Appeal from USDC ND Calif 
No. 71'-lsirel i. OT 1~1]2 ._'."! . 
Norvell v. Apodaca 
Appeal from New Mex SC 
No. 71-1512 OT 1972 
Brown v. Apodaca 
Cert 
No. 12-193 OT 1972 
Fowler v. Culbertson 
Appeal from USDC D South 
No. 71-6852 OT 1972 
Lubin v. Allison 
Cert to Calif SC 
,J-JA 
DISCUSS 
Attached are the cert notes in each of these filing 
fee cases which have been relisted for reconsideration 
together. These cases all grow out of the uncertainties of 
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). Two of them are 
state appeals from primary filing fees which were struck 
down by federal courts and two others are appeals by dis" 
appointed plaintiffs who unsuccessfully attacked state fee 
--2--
requirements. 
(1) Brown v. Chote is the decision by a federal three-
judge ct striking down the California requirement that a 
candidate for Congress pay 1% of the salary of a Congress" 
man ($425.00) to get on the primary ballot. There is no 
alternative to the fee, 
(2) Norvell v. Apodaca is a decision by the New 
Mexico SC upholding the State primary filing fee requirement 
that every candidate pay in 6 % of the salary of the office 
he is seeking. One-half of that amonnt will be refunded 
if the candidate polls at least 15% of the voters. For a 
candidate for Congress this requires an initial outlay of 
$2550. Again, there is no alternative in New Mexico to 
paying the fee, (Jay has not written a note on 1$12--Brown 
v. Apodaca but I have received a copy of the papers. I think 
it may be helpful to take a look at the standing issue that 
appears to bother Jay. As you know a federal three-judge 
ct held last March that New Mexico could not enforece its 
filing fee requirement to candidates for U.S. Senate from 
having their names placed on the ballot. The State AG 
did not appeal that judgment. Thereafter he issued a memo 
order to the State Sec of State ordering that she not 
assess filing fees under the statute. An official acting on 
behalf of the State then brought a mandamus action against 
the AG seeking an order from the N.Mex SC that his order be 
rescinded and thatcandidates be ordered to comply with the 
filing requirement. The SC of NMEx agreed and issued a 
mandamus order instructing the AG and Sec of State to 
strike the names of any candidates who would not comply with 
--3--
fee requirement. The AG appeals in No 71-1511 from that 
judgment. Under these circumstances I do not think that there 
is a serious standing questions the State AG is subject to 
comply with an order that he thinks is unconstitutional. I 
have never heard of a civil case in which an injunction was 
entered against the defendant but he was not allowed to 
appeal. No 71-1512 is a cert petn filed by candidates who 
sought to intervene in the state ct but were refused. Their 
case presents an attenuated version of the case since they 
must first persuade the ct that it was a denial of due process 
for the ct bel0lw mot to have allowed them to intervene. 
I doubt eeriously whether Petrs can succeed. Therefore, 
although your conference notes seem to indicate a different 
view, I would think that the case to grant is 1511 and that 
1512 should simply be held.) 
(3) Fowler v. Culbertson is a three judge ct decision 
from Soulth Carolina which struck down that State 0 s filing 
fee requirement for party primaries. There a state senate 
candidate was unable to pay $500 and a state candidate for 
U.S. Senate was unable to pay a $4,000 fee. 
(4) Lubin v. Allison is a Calif state decision up-
holding a $700 filing fee for candidacy in the Bd of Super-
visprs race in Las Angeles County. I know nothing more 
about this case other than what is in Jay 0 s cert petn. 
RECOMMENDATION 
It is my judgment--in agreement with Jay 0 s--that the 
Ct must do something about the Norvell case. It must be 
either summarily reversed or granted for clarification and 
reversed. I lean toward the latter alternative since the 
raw numbers fo filing fee questions that are coming up 
--4--
is indicative that the Bullock opinion needs to be explained. 
I would note No. 71-1511 and hold the other cases pending 
decision. You should 9 of course, await the views of both the 
CJ and Justice White since each has peculiar expertise in 
this area. 
NOTE 71-1511 & HOLD OTHERS LAH 
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Notes on No. 71"1583 
Brown v. Chote 
\\CK 
February 21, 1973 
The question posed by this case is whether 
California's requirement that a candidate for 
the United States Congress must pay a $425 filing 
fee to enter a party primary election is constitutional. 
The central precedent is of course Bullock v. Carter, 
405 U.S. 134(1972), although our discussiorsof voting 
in Rodriguez and Rosario are at least tangentially 
relevant. 
Unfortunately, the opinion in Bullock is hardly 
a model of clarity. The language is a potpourri of 
everyone's views on equal protection. Perhaps the 
best place to start is with the facts of that case. 
The filing fees there ranged from $150 to $8900, 
depending upon the office for which the cancfidate 
was running. There, as here 0 the fees were levied 
on all who wished to run in the primary. Texas 
afforded no alternative avenue to the paying of the 
filing fee"~that is, Texas did not allow a cnadidate 
to place his name on the ballot by amassing some 
number of signatures on a nominating petition. 
In striking down the Texas scheme, the Court 
identified as possible state interests the raising of 
revenue(or saving of expenses) and the elimination of 
frivolous candidacies. As to the first, the Court 
\ 
fo~nd that the state could not constitutionally 
finance tahe primary elections through filing fees • 
..... 
.. 2 .. 
"Appellants seem to place reliance on the self-
evident fact that if the State must assume the 
cost, the voters, as taxpayers, will ultimat:Eiy 
be burdened with the expense of the primaries. 
But it is far too late to make out a case 
that the party primary ys such a lesser part 
of the democratic process that its cost must 
be shifted away from the taxpayers generally. 
]he financial burden for general elections 
is carried by all taxpayers and appellants have 
not demonstrated a valid basis for distinguishing 
betweenthese two legitimate costs of the 
democratic process." at 148. 
At the same time, the Court did not go the whole route, 
compare Harper, to say that the state had no financial 
interest. 
/I "It must be emphasized that nothing herein 
1' is intended to cast doubt on the validity 
of reasonable candidate filing fees •••• " 
I\ at 149 • 
This passage is illuminted by footnote 29, at 1481 
This would be a different case if the fees 
approximated the cost of processing a candidate 0 s 
application for a place on the ballot, a cost 
resulting from the candidate's decision to 
enter a primary. The term filing fee has long 
been thought to cover the cost of filing, that 
is, the cost of placing a particular document 
on the public record." 
In sum, as I read Bullock, the dictum in that case 
allows the state to vindicate it financial interest 
only to the extent of covering minor administ•rative 
costs, perhaps a few dollars or even up to, sayJ 
$40 or $50. 
I 
The state.5 other interest in Bullock was the 
m,ore complicated one of protecting "the integrity of 
its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent 
-3-
candidacies." at 145. While recogni•zing that of course 
high fili8ng fees have some deterrent effect, the 
Court found that the state's means were insufficiently 
well tailored to its end•. The means were both 
overinclusive, in the sense of precluding poor but 
serious candidates from running, and underinclusive, 
in that "even assuming that every person paying the 
large fees required by Texas law. takes his own 
canddacy seriously, that does not make him a 
11 serious candidate' in the popular sense." at 146. 
I think that Bullock could well be read to 
stand for the proposition that• a state may simply 
not use financial deterrence as a means of eliminating 
frivolous candidacies. Indeed, I do not think that 
there is support in the te•x~ of the opinion for any 
other reading. However, the Court did note that 
Texas afforded no other means of access to the 
primary ballot, presumably leaving open the question 
~h•I-Ri: whether the state could force those unable to 
pay a filing fee a to submit a petition with 
signatures. 
In the present case, I do not think that the 
fee charged by California, here $425, is a filing 
fee as defined in footnote 29 of the Chief's opinion 
in Bullock, see supra. $425 is surely more than 






Nor, for the reasons sketched above, do I 
think that the filing fee may be used as a deterrent. 
Apart from the fact that it may be an absolute bar 
to some, it is bound to have a differential effect 
on prospective candidates according to their wealth. 
A The fee here, -- $425, is greater than the a 
lowest fee held unconstitutional in Bullock, $150. 
It is no answer, I think, that the profu,ects 
for a successful candidacy are powerfully influenced 
by one 0 s personal wealth and that of his friends 
and associates. This is a pervasive fact of our 
economic and political system, but not one directly 
decreed by government. The filing fee, on the other 
hand, is directly prescribed by California and 
augments the disparity of resources between the 
wealthy and the poor. And while of course the 
poor or middle income candidate may benefit from 
the support of a party or union or association, 
this is more likeG to be true in a general election 
than in a primary. If the right to vote for 
a candidate of one ' s choice is indeed preservative 
of other rights, then a state ought not to erect an 
irrelevant barrier to the opportunity to run for public 
office. I would affirm, leaving open what would 
bappen if a state afforded an alternative means 
for obtaining a place on the ballot. 
! 
CHAMBERS OF' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: No. 71-1583 - Brown v. Chote and "Hold" cases 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
We have all been aware that our "hold" cases on Brown v. 
Chote, may include a case to treat the basic question sought to be 
raised relating to election filing fees. Here is a summary of each 
case we are presently holding for Brown v. Chote: 
(1) No. 71-1511 -- Norvell v. Apodaca -- Appeal to the 
New Mexico Supreme Court. Under the New Mexico filing fee system, 
a candidate must pay 6% of the first year salary of the office which he 
seeks in order to gain entrance to the primary election. For example, 
the fee for U:nited States Senator is $2,550. If the candidate receives 
15% of the electoral vote, one-half of the fee is refunded. The fees 
not refunded pay for part of the costs of the election. (This is much 
like the British system that has worked so well.) 
After a decision of a Three-Judge Court, District Court for 
the District of New Mexico, holding part of the filing fee system uncon-
stitutional, the New Mexico Secretary of State issued an opinion, stating 
that all New Mexico filing fees were unconstitutional. A candidate for 
office then filed a petition for a "Writ of Mandate II in the New Mexico 
Supreme Court, asking that the Secretary of State be required to strike 
the names of all primary candidates who had not paid the fees. Defining 
a serious candidate as one who could gain 15% of the electoral vote, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court found as a fact that no serious candidate had 
ever been prevented by the fees charged from running for office. Since 
the fees were thus reasonable, and were related to legitimate state 
purposes (eleiminating overcrowded ballots and frivolous candidates), 
the, Court held that they were constitutional. 
-2-
The name party in the above case was the Secretary of State. 
She did not appeal to this Court but this appeal was filed by the Attorney 
General of New Mexico, who had represented the Secretary of State and 
who had specifically been enjoined by the New Mexico Supreme Court from 
issuing an advisory opinion which conflicted with the New Mexico Supreme 
Court decision. 
(2) No. 71-1512 -- Brown v. Apodaca -- Certiorari to New 
Mexico Supreme Court. Petitioners wished to become candidates in a 
New Mexico primary election. When the New Mexico Supreme Court 
accepted jurisdiction in Norvell v. Apodaca, petitioners moved to inter-
vene. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied them leave to intervene 
without opinion. Petitioners ask this Court to determine (a) whether they 
were denied due process when they were denied leave to intervene; (b) 
whether petitioners now have standing to appeal from the decision in 
Norvell v. Apodaca; and (c) whether the New Mexico filing fee system 
is unconstitutional. 
(3) No. 71-6852 -- ~,ubin v. Allison (Registrar of Los Angeles 
County) -- Cert. to· California Supreme Court. The filing fee system 
challenged here is precisely the same statutory system challenged in 
Brown v. Chote. However, whereas Brown v. Chote covered only state-
wide offices, this suit challenged the validity of the fees as applied to ~ 
lesser state offices. The fees charged in California are either 1% or 
2% of the first year salary of the office sought. / 
Petitioner, who is indigent, wished to run for the Board of 
Supervisors of Los Angeles County. Respondent refused to issue to 
petitioner a set of blank registration forms unless petitioner first 
presented a check for $701. 60. Petitioner filed a petition for a Writ 
of Mandate in California Superior Court, asking that he and members 
of his class be allowed to register without paying the required fees. On 
demurrer, the Superior Court held that the State had a legitimate objec-
tive in preventing fraudulent or frivolous candidates from running for 
office and that the amount of the fees charged was reasonable "as a 
matter of law. 11 Since the fees were reasonable, the court held that 
the State need not provide an alternative means of gaining access to 
the ballot. Subsequent petitions for a Writ of Mandate to the California 
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court were denied. 
______ ..,_.......,.,..,...,,,.. .... \... ,.,.,, -""' . ...,. _____ .,.,._.,..__.,.,... __ ......,.., 
- 3 -
(4) No. 72-193 - - Fowler (South Carolina Democratic Party) 
v. Culbertson - - Appeal to Three-Judge Court, District Court for the~ 
District of South Carolina (Craven, Russell, Simons). Under South 
Carolina law, a candidate who wishes to run in a primary election 
must file a declaration of candidacy. At that time, he must pay a fee lJ,I'/ 
of $500. The candidate may also be assessed by the political party 1· l -
in whose primary he wishes to run. The amount of the assessment \ 
1 
-~ 
is left to the discretion of the political party; according to the District~/ 
Court, the total fees charged range from $500 to $5,000. The fees 
are paid to the political parties, to be used as they wish. This is 
closer to Bullock than other cases. 
Appellee, who wished to be a primary candidate for United 
States Senator, filed this action, challenging the South Carolina filing 
fee system. The District Court ruled that $850 was the maximum 
permissible fee which could be charged under the Constitution. Appellant 
was ordered to adjust other fees downward, so as not to exceed 2% of the 
annual salary of the office sought. The District Court also ruled that 
indigents could become candidates without paying any fee and that excess 
fees paid to political parties had to be returned. Having determined that 
an injunction should issue , the Three-Judge Court dissolved itself and 
returned jurisdiction to a single district court for further proceedings. 
Appellant argues that the District Court acted improperly in 
granting relief before evidence was taken or an answer to the complaint 
filed. He further contends that the court did not know the range of fees 
charged inSouth Carolina. 
1 
(J .\ 
(5) No. 72-455 -- Bush v. Sebesta (Fla.) -- Appeal to Three-~-
Judge Court, District Court for the Middle District of Florida (Roney, 
Krentzman, Hodges). Florida requires candidates in primary elections 
for state salaried offices to pay 5% of the first year salary of the office 
to have their names placed on the ballot. Approximately 80% of the fees 
charged are paid by the State to the political parties, to be spent as the 
parties wish. The remainder is paid into the state treasury. 
This class action, challenging the Florida filing fee system, 
was filed by Miranda. Appellant Bush, who is indigent, intervened. 
To run for the office he sought, appellant would have had to pay $600 • 
... . -
- 4 -
The District Court held that a filing fee of 5% was reasonable. However, 
it also ruled that the State had to provide some alternative means by 
which indigent candidates could gain access to the ballot. Since an election 
was about to take pl ace, the District Court established "interim standards" 
for the qualification of indigent candidates: (a) those who wished to run for 
state-wide offices had to secure 10,000 signatures from qualified voters; 
(b) those running for other offices had to secure the signatures of 1 % of 1 / 
the qualified voters, but not . more than 3,000 nor less than 100 signatures:-
The sur:rrn.ary order of the District Court notes that a full opinion will 
follow. -
Appellant contends that the District Court should have struck down 
the entire Florida filing fee system, rather than provide an alternative 
means for indigents to gain access to the ballot. Apparently, part of 
appellant's argument relates to the fact that fees collected in Florida 
go to the political parties for whatever use they choose. 
(6) No. 72-5187 -- Fair v. Taylor -- (Three-Judge Court, 
District Coµrt for the Middle District of Florida). This case was con- ~ 
solidated by the District Court with Bush v. Sebesta. Appellant is well, I~ 
known in the Clerk's office in our Court since he has filed some 31 ~
previous £!.£ ll petitions and appeals. His petition is difficult to decipher. 
The Clerk's office informs me that appellant is presently confined to a 
mental institution in Florida. 
Although in most cases above, it is clear that the courts acted 
on "11th hour" cases and had to respond quickly in the face of approaching 
deadlines, it is not at all clear that relief granted was intended to be of a 
strictly interim nature. If we can find a case in this motley collection we 





This alternative plan was suggested by appellee (the State). 
To date, ~the District Court has filed no op1ruon. The Clerk's office 
has been ad~ised that an opinion may be filed sho:i;tly. 
6 BROWN v. CHOTE 
the District Court's swift action is understandable in view 
of the deadline which it faced, the resulting record was 
simply insufficient to allow that court to consider fully 
the grave, far-reaching constitutional questions presented. 
The specific deadline which led the District Court to 
grant equitable relief has now passed.4 Nothing pre-
cludes appellee from seeking a trial on the merits, if he 
chooses to proceed. The case is therefore remanded to 
the District Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.5 
Remanded for further proceedings. 
4 Although the June 6 primary election has passed, the question 
raised is one "capable of repitition, yet evading review." Conse-
quently, the case is not moot. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. 
ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); Roe v. Wade, No. 70-18, slip opin-
ion, at 10 (1973). 
5 We have granted certiorari in No. 71-6852, Lubin v. Allison, in 
order to consider conflicts in holdings regarding the constitutionality 




NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will he re-
leased, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time 
the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber 
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffi 
Syllabus 
BROWN, SECRETARY OF STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA v. CHOTE 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
No. 71-1583. Argued February 22, 1973-Decided May 7, 1973 
Appellee, who sought to run for Congress but asserted that he was 
unable to pay California's statutory filing fee, filed a class action 
in District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the filing-fee 
statutes. In the face of an impending filing deadline, the District 
Court granted appellee's motion for a preliminary injunction. 
Held: Given the possibility that appellee would prevail on the 
merits and the fact that appellee's opportunity to be a candidate 
would have been foreclosed absent interim relief, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction. 
Pp. 4-6. 
342 F. Supp. 1353, affirmed and remanded. 







NOTICE: This opinion Is subject to formal revision before publlcatlon 
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are re-
quested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other 
formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the pre-
liminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-1583 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Secre-
tary of State of California, 
Appellant, 
V. 
Raymond G. Chote. 
On Appeal from the 
United States District 
Court for the Northern 
District of California. 
[May 7, 1973] 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
This case arises under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 on direct ap-
peal from a three-judge district court in the Northern 
District of California. The court was convened pur-
suant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 when appellee called into 
question the constitutionality of those provisions of the 
California Elections Code which require candidates in a 
primary election to pay a filing fee prior to having their 
names listed on the primary ballot. _ Calif. Elections 
Code §§ 6552 and 6553. Under these provisions, candi-
dates for the federal House of Representatives must pay 
$425 ( 1 % of the annual salary of the office) ; candidates 
for the federal Senate must pay $850 (2% of the salary of 
the office). Those wishing to run for statewide offices 
must pay similar fees ranging in amount from $192 for 
State Assemblyman ( 1 % of the annual salary) to $982 
for Governor (2% of the annual salary). Other portions 
of the California Elections Code, not challenged in the 
present suit, require prospective candidates to file with 
appropriate state officials a declaration of candidacy and 
sponsor certificates. Calif. Elections Code §§ 6490-6491, 
6494--6495. 
2 BROWN v. CHOTE 
Appellee commenced this class action on March 3, 1972. 
He moved and w~ granted permission by a single district 
judge to proceed in forma pauperis and as his own at-
torney. In his complaint, appellee asserted that he 
wished to become a candidate for the federal House of 
Representatives from the 17th District of California, and 
had taken the following steps to place his name in nom-
ination in the June 6, 1972, California primary election. 
On February 17, 1972, appellee called the Registrar of 
Voters of Santa Cla;ra County, an official designated by 
state law to dispense those forms necessary to place a 
name in nomination. Appellee was purportedly told by 
the Registrar or a member of his office that he was re-
quired to pay $425 in advance in order to secure blank 
copies of the necessary papers. According to appellee, 
the Registrar's Office also advised him that the papers 
would be delivered in exchange for a worthless check.1 
Appellee proceeded immediately to the Registrar's Of-
fice where he presented a personal check for $425 and 
requested copies of the necessary forms. Across the face 
of the check, appellee had typed "Written under protest 
for filing fee." 2 The Registrar issued the requisite papers 
to appellee and informed him that his check would be for-
warded to the California Secretary of State when his com-
1 The State denies that such advice was ever communicated to 
appellee. In an affidavit submitted to the District Court, the Regis-
trar of Voters of Santa Clara County stated that it was the policy 
of his office not to distribute the required forms to anyone who rep-
resented to the Registrar that the check submitted was worthless. 
The Registrar further stated that, to his knowledge, neither he nor 
anyone in his office had ever informed appellee that forms would 
be issued upon presentation of a worthless check. 
2 When the case was argued before the District Court, appellee 
claimed that he had also told the Registrar or a member of his 
office that the account on which the check was drawn did not con-
tain sufficient funds to cover it. However, this fact is not alleged 
in the complaint. 
l 
BROWN v. CHOTE 3 
pleted papers were submitted. Subsequently, a Deputy 
Secretary of State informed appellee that his name would 
not be placed on the ballot if his check was not honored.3 
Citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972), appel-
lee asserted that California's filing fee system was un-
constitutional since it barred indigents, such as himself, 
from seeking elective office and from voting for the can-
didate of his or her choice. In addition to requesting 
declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, appellee 
moved the District Court to issue a preliminary injunc-
tion so as to allow him to participate as a candidate in 
the upcoming primary. Under state law, the final date 
on which appellee could submit nominating papers for 
that primary was March 10, 1972, one week away. 
Because of the impending filing deadline, the District 
Court proceeded quickly to set the case for argument. 
On March 3, 1972, the same date on which the suit was 
filed, the single District Judge to whom the case was 
assigned entered an order requiring appellant to show 
cause why interlocutory relief should not be granted. 
The State was given five days in which to respond. It 
was not until March 7 that the Chief Judge of the Ninth 
Circuit was notified of the application for a three judge 
court. On March 8, he designated the judges who were 
to comprise the panel. On the same day, the court con-
vened and heard oral argument. Because of the speed 
with which the case had developed, neither the court nor 
appellee had an opportunity prior to the hearing to 
consider appellant's return to the order to show cause, 
the only paper which the State had been able to prepare. 
On March 9, 1972, one day after oral argument and 
one day before the deadline for filing nomination papers, 
3 Appellant submitted to the District Court an affidavit from the 
Deputy Secretary of State to whom appellee had spoken, disputing 
appellee's claim that he had been informed that his name would not 
be placed on the ballot if his check was not honored. 
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the District Court granted appellee's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction-, stating: 
"Since no . . . showing has been made by the 
state concerning either the necessity, the purpose of 
the reasonableness of the filing fee statutes in ques-
tion, we conclude that within the rationale of Bul-
lock [ v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972)], plaintiff may 
prevail on the merits and that, absent a preliminary 
injunction, his constitutional right may be irrepa-
rably lost." (Emphasis added.) 
Under the terms of the preliminary injunction, the State 
was required to allow appellee and others similarly situ-
ated to place their names on the ballot without paying 
the required fee, so long as they were otherwise eligible 
for the applicable state or federal office and had deposited 
with an appropriate state official an affidavit attesting 
to their indigency. 
The State appealed directly to this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1253. Its Jurisdictional Statement posed two 
questions: 
"Under the decision of this Court in Bullock v. 
Carter, 405 U. S. 134 ( 1972), when a state statute 
requiring a candidate's filing fee of one per cent 
( 1 % ) of the first years salary for the office is chal-
lenged on Equal Protection grounds does the 'ra-
tional basis' or 'close scrutiny' standard of judicial 
review apply? 
"Do California Election Code sections 6552 and 
6553 deny voters or indigent prospective candidates 
equal protection of the laws?" 
Thus, the State of California, for reasons not clear to us 
in light of the limited record, asked the Court to address 
itself to the ultimate merits of appellee's constitutional 
claim, a question which the District Court did not reach. 
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In the present posture of the case, there is no occasion to 
consider any issues beyond those addressed by the Dis-
trict Court. 
The issuance of the requested preliminary injunction 
was the only action taken by the District Court. In de-
termining whether such relief was required, that court 
properly addressed itself to two relevant factors: first, 
the appellee's possibilities of success on the merits; and 
second, the possibility that irreparable injury would have 
resulted absent interlocutory relief. As the District Court 
opinion clearly evidences, issuance of the injunction re-
flected the balance which that court reached in weighing 
these factors and was not in any sense intended as a final 
decision as to the constitutionality of the challenged stat-
ute. In the exigent circumstances, the grant of extraor-
dinary interim relief was a permissible choice; but on 
the very limited record before the District Court a de-
cision on the merits would not have been appropriate. 
In reviewing such interlocutory relief, this Court may 
only consider whether issuance of the injunction consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion. State of Alabama v. United 
States, 279 U. S. 229 (1929); United States v. Corrick, 
298 U. S. 435 (1936); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public 
Service Commission of West Virginia, 278 U. S. 322 
(1929); National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford v. 
Thompson, 281 U. S. 331 (1930). In light of the argu-
ments presented by appellee and the fact that appellee's 
opportunity to be a candidate would have been foreclosed 
absent some relief, we cannot conclude that the court's 
action was an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm 
the action taken by the District Court in granting interim 
relief. 
In doing so, we intimate no view as to the ultimate 
merits of appellee's contentions. The record in this case 
clearly reflects the limited time which the parties had to 




No. 71-6852 Lubin v. Panish, Registrar-
Recorder, County of Los Angeles 
Summer Memorandum 
This is a brief memorandum dictated after having 
read most of the briefs. It is entirely preliminary and, 
in large degree superficial. Further study is indicated. 
Statement of the Case 
This is the case we granted last spring at the time 
we handed down Brown v. Chote - May 7, 1973. We took the case 
in order to reach the substantive issues raised in Chote. 
These issues relate to the validity of California 
election laws which require the payment by all candidates for 
federal state and local offices of filing fees (ranging from 
1 to 2% of the salary of the office sought). This petitioner, 
Lubin, sought to run for the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles 
County, and claimed he was unable to pay the filing fee of 
$701 .60 . He then filed this class action, attacking the 
California system as being invalid because it created a 
classificsition based on wealth (denying "poor people the right 
to seek public office solely because of their economic station"), 
denies petitions and members of his class the opportunity to 
vote for candidates of their choice. 
In arguing these points, petitioner relies heavily 
on his contention that California "provides no alternative to 
2. 
the f i ling fee requirement" (p . 5, 12, 13 of petitioner's brief) . 
In this connection, petitioner relies on Bullock v . Carter in 
which the Court referred to the absence under Texas law of an 
alternative means of qualifying, for example, "by way of 
petitioning voters and write - in votes " - neither of which was 
permitted in Texas . 
The state does not contest the holding in Bullock that 
the compelling state interest test is applicable . Rather, it 
asserts that California does have a compelling interest, that 
the fee is a modest requirement to demonstrate the good faith 
of the candidate and also that he has a modicum of support . 
Comment 
As these questions were argued and considered - but 
did not form the basis of our opinion - in Chote, no further 
elaboration is necessary in this memorandum . 
I am asking Sally - by this reference - to put the 
Chote file and the file on this case is a single large red ~ 
folder so that I will have both files before me . 
JCJjr/ gg 
MEMORANDUM 
No. 71-6852 Lubinv. Panish 
I find this a confusing case. The difficulty largely stems 
from Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). There the Court 
purportedly decided whether filing fee restrictions on aspirants to 
public office must be subjected to strict scrutiny. In a baffling passage, 
I { 
the Court said that the Texas scheme implicated tl].e right to vote as ------ ---- -
~ ,, 
well as the right to be a candidate: 
"The initial and direct impact of filing f'ees is 
felt by aspirants for office, rather than voters, and the 
Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental 
status to condidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of 
review. However, the rights of voters and the rights 
of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; 
laws that affect candidates always have some theoretical 
correlative, effect on voters. Id.,at 142-43." 
If right to vote is equated with freedom of choice, it may well be that 
restrictions on candidacy burden that right. A voter may wish to cast 
his ballot for an indigent who cannot pay the filing fees, or for an 
y: 
ill'iterate who cannot qualify to stand, or for an alien. These factors 
and others that have nothing to do with governmental regulation, ~. g. , 
who chooses to run, may limit a voter's range of choice. To my mind, 
,. 
2. 
( these restrictions on candidacy do not sufficiently implicate the 
l 
;ight to vote to justify the strict scrutiny usually associate~ ith st'.'1e 




One may also argue that the filing-fee restrictions on candidates 
involve a wealth classification among voters. This argument is founded 
on the hypothetical case of an utterly indigent candidate with equally 
destitute supporters. The aspirant cannot run, and his supporters 
are thus denied the opportunity to vote for the candidate of their choice 
because they cannot afford to pay his fees for him. I think this is an 
unreal case. The class of voters who cannot afford to pay the fees of 
their candidate need not be composed entirely of poor persons. A non-
indigent but nQ!: wealthy voter may be unable to pay the entire fee re uired ..  "", . ~ - ---------- - =----=---------_;,_-
by a would-be _<:__andidate without other solvent backers. In any event, 
there is no way to establish the indigency of a candidate's supporters."I~ 
Realistically, aspirants to local office may have no supporting group 
in advance of formal candidacy. Therefore, I do not believe that filij 1 
~~ 
fee restrictions on candidacy can be said to establish a wealth 
classification among voters. The determinative criterion must be the 
i~f the ~ould-be candidat~ rather than the financial position 





Bullock v. Carter dealt with the Texas system in terms of 
strict review: 
"Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a 
real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the 
franchise, and because this impact is related to the 
resources of the voters supporting a particular 
candidate, we conclude, as in Harper, that the laws 
must be "closely scrutinized" and found reasonably 
necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state 
objectives in order to pass constitutional muster. 
Id., at 144" 
3. 
In addition to the unusual phrasing of the test ("reasonably necessary"), 
this pronouncement is hedged by confusing qualifications. I would not 
treat Bullock as establishing that a citizen's interest in becoming a 
candidate for public office is a fundamental one for purposes of equal 
protection analysis. The state's interest in restricting access to the 
ballot so that the real choices are not obscured b a long list of frivolous 
candidates seems to me perfectly legitimate. It would be unwise to 
subject the myriad restrictions surrounding candidacy to the exacting 
scrutiny that would follow if the right to be a candidate were announced 
as fundamental. 
Finally, I come to the way I think you should view this case. I 
think the question is whether California's scheme creates an i1*idious 
wealth classification among aspirants for office. In Rodriguez, you 
,· 
stated the two distinguishing characteristics: 
"because of their impecunity they were completely 
unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a 
consequence they sustained an absolute deprivation 
of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit." 
411 U.S. 1, 20." 
4. 
Whether the California scheme meets these requirements is a close 
question. Clearly the second half of the test is satisfied. The 
aspirant to public office who cannot raise the necessary funds is 
absolutely denied the opportunity to appear on the primary ballot. The 
first condition is more difficult. A would-be candidate without significant 
support has no legitimate interest in appearing on the ballot. If you 
are willing to add that any serious candidate could raise $701, then this 
is not a suspect wealth classification. On the other hand, one could 
argue that a serious candidate could be unable to raise the fees required 
in California. This seems especially plausible in the context of local 
elections in which supporting groups do not normally coalesce in advance 
of formal candidacy. Thus an indigent aspirant could be completely 
u~pay. While this is not clear one way or another, I inc line 
l!f.was -
to the latter view. 
If you ~.nrude that no suspect classification is involved, then 
the matter is at an end. If, however, you decide that the California 
scheme does discriminate among would-be candidates on the basis of 
wealth, you must confront some subsidiary issues. California 
could save its system by allowing an alternative route to the ballot 
5. 
for indigents. The poor candidate who is allowed to get on the ballot -
by presenting signed petitions does not suffer "absolute deprivation 
of a meaningful opportunity" under Rodriguez. Therefore, no suspect 
wealth classification is involved. A write-in alternative would not 
suffice since it does not provide an opportunity to get on the primary 
ballot. That is the benefit denied. 
The hypothetical scheme -- fairly substantial filing fees with a ] 
petition alternative -- would be judged under a rational basis test. _ 
Although I think it could survi.that relaxed review, the issue not 
free from doubt. One might argue, for example, that the state scheme 
is irrational because it allows any kook with money in his pocket to 
get on to the ballot and therefore does not further the legitimate 
state interest of keeping frivolous candidates, i.~., those without 
support, from appearing. 
JCJjr 
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From : 'i·ha t.:h.1.ef Just.we 
7 1974 Q, , ~ 
1 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S~ted: MAR 
f~ No. 71-6852 Reoiroulated: _______ _.__ 




llfc~rder, County of 
Los Angeles. 
On Writ of Certiorari t-0 the 
Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia. 
[March --, 1074] 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BuRGEH delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
We granted certiorari to consider petitioner's claim 
that the California statute requirillg payment of a filing 
fee of $701.t:iO i11 order t-0 be placed 011 the ballot in the 
primary election for nomination to the pu:sition of 
Coullty f-iupervi:sor, while pruvidillg no alternative means 
of access to the uallot, deprived hittt, as a11 ill(ligent per-
son unable to pay the fee , of the equal prutection 
guaranteed by the .FourLee11th Amendmellt a11d rights of 
expre:ssion and association guara11teerl by the .First 
Amendment. 
The ( 'alifornia Election Code provides that forms 
required for nomination and election to congressional, 
state, and county offices are to be issued to candidates 
only upon prepayment of a nonrefundable filing fee. 
Cal. Elections Corle ~ ti551. Generally. the required fees 
are fixed at a percentage of the salary for the office 
sought. The fee for candidates for lf nited ~tates Hena-
tor, Governor, and other state offices and some county 
offices, is 2% of the annual salary. Candidates for 
2 
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Representative to Congress, State Senator or Assembly .. 
man, or for judicial office or district attorney, must pay 
1 %- No filing fee is required of candidates in the presi-
dential primary, or for offices which pay either no fixed 
salary or not more than $600 annually. Cal. Elections 
Code §§ 6551, 6552. and 6554. 
Under the California statutes in effect at the time this 
suit was commenced, the required candidate filing fees 
ranged from $192 for State Assembly, $425 for Congress, 
$701.60 for Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 
$850 for United States Senator, to $982 for Governor. 
The California statute provides for the counting of 
write-in votes subject to certain conditions. Cal. Elec-
tions Code § 18602 et seq. Write-in votes are not 
counted, however, unless the person desiring to be a 
write-in candidate files a statement to that effect with 
the Registrar-Recorder at least eight days prior to the 
.election, Cal. Elections Code § 18602, and pays the 
requisite filing fee, Cal. Elections Code § 18603. The 
latter section provides that "No name written upon a 
ballot in any state. county, city, city and county, or 
district election shall be counted for an office or nornina" 
tion unless ... the fee required by Section 6555 is paid 
when the declaration of write-in cttndidacy is filed . . , ." 
Cal. Elections Code § 18603. Thus, the contested filing 
fees must be satisfied even under the write-in nomination 
procedures. 
Petitioner with others commenced this class act10n on 
February 17, 1972, by petitioning the Los Angeles 
Superior Court for a writ of mandate against the Secre-
tary of State and the Los Angeles County Registrar-
Recorder. The suit was filed on behalf of petitioner and 
all those similarly situated persons who were unable 
to pay the filing fees and who desired to be nominated 
for public office. In his complaint, petitioner maintained 
that he was a citize11 and a voter and that he had sought 
,1-fi852-0PlNION 
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homination as a candidate for membership on the Board 
of Supervisors for Los Angeles County.' Petitioner 
asserted that on February 15, 1972, he had appeared at 
the office of James S. Allison, then Registrar-Recorder of 
the County of Los Angeles, to apply for and secure all 
necessary nomination papers requisite to his proposed 
candidacy. Petitioner was denied the requested nomina-
tion papers orally and in writing solely because he was 
unable to pay the $701.60 filing fee required of all would-
be candidates for the office of Board of 8upervisors. 
The Los Angeles Superior Court denied the requested 
writ of mandate on March 6, 1972. Petitioner alleged 
that he was a serious candidate, that he was indigent and 
,that he was unable to pay the $701.60 filing fee; no 
evidence was taken during the hearing. The superior 
court found the fees to be "reasonable, as a matter of 
law." Accordingly, the court made no attempt to deter-
mine whether the fees charged were necessary to the 
State's purpose, or whether the fees, in addition to 
deterring some frivolous candidates, also prohibited 
serious but indigent candidates from entering their names 
on the ballot. The superior court also rejected the 
argument that the State was required by Bullock v. 
Carte,r, 405 U.S. (1972), to provide an alternative means 
of access to the ballot which did not discriminate on the 
basis of economic factors. 
On March 22, 1972, a second petition for writ of man-
date was denied by the Court of Appeals, Second Dist., 
and on March 22, 1972, after the deadline for filing 
'nomination papers had passed, the California Supreme 
Court denied petitioner's third application for a writ of 
mandate. 
1 The Board of Suprrvisor~ for Lo~ Angek~ Co11nty i~ thr gowrn-
ing body for Los Angrlr~ Co11nty, California. Tlw trrm i~ four year~, 
the annual ~alnry $35,080. 
4 
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Historically, since the Progressive movement of the 
early 20th Century, there has been a steady trend toward 
limiting the size of the ballot in "order to concentrate the 
attention of the electorate 011 the selection of a much 
smaller number of officials and so afford to the voters the 
opportunity of exercising more discrimination in their 
use of the franchise."~ This desire to limit thr sizr of 
the ballot has been variously phrased as a desire to mini-
mize voter coufusion. Thomas"· Mims, 317 F. Supp. 17f). 
181 (SD Ala. 1970). to limit tlw number of runoff elec-
tions, Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550, 55:1 ( MD 
Fla. 1970), to curb "ballot flooding." Jenness ,·. Little, 
306 F. Supp. 925. 027 ( XD Ga. H)60), appC'al disnnsscd 
sub 11am. Matthews "· Little, 3n7 C S. D4 (1!170). and 
to prevent the overwhelming of voting machines-the 
modern coull tcrpart of ballot floodi ~1~ Tl' etherillytu,1 \', 
Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318. 321 ( MD Fla. 1970). A 
majority of States have long required the payment of 
some form of filing fee.:' in part to limit the ballot and 
iu part to have candidates pay some of the administra-
tive costs. 
In sharp contrast to this fear of an unduly lengthy 
ballot is an increasiug pressure for broader access to the 
ballot. Thus, while progressive thought in the first half 
of the century was concerned with restricting the ballot 
to achieve voting rationality. recent decades brought au 
enlarged demand for an expansio11 of political opportu-
nity. The Twenty-fifth Amendment. the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment, and the Voting Rights Act of 1065. 42 
U. S. C. ~ 1973 ( 1970), reflect this shift in emphasis. 
There has also been a gradual enlargement of the Four-
teenth Amendme11 t's equal protection provisions in the 
2 H. Croly, Progrr~~ivr Democra<·~· :289 (1914) . 
~ See 120 U. Pa . L. HeY. 109 (1971), for a detaile<l dr~<'nption of 
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area of voting rights. Although there is no explicit pro-
vision for a right to vote within the text of the Constitu-
tion itself, 
"It has b<'<'n established i11 recent years that the 
Equal Prot<'ction Clause confers thP substantive 
right to participat<' on a11 <'qt1al basis with other 
qualified vot<'rs wlw11evPr thP State' has adopted .an 
clcctora l proc<'SS for dPtPrmi 11i11g who will represent 
any segment of thP Stat<'·s population. See, e. (J., 
Reynold::, Y. 8i111s, :177 l'. Si' Pi33; Kramer v. Unio1i 
School Distri:ct, 3f!5 l·. S. (i21; /)u1111 ,·. Blumstein, 
405 l'. S. :3;30, ;~:16." Sa11 A11to11io School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 F. S. l, 39 JI. 2 (l!l73) (Stewart, J., 
COllCI I rri1 lg), 
This ptfoeiple flowF: 11aturally from our recognition that 
"legislators ar<~ <'lt'cted by voters . not farms or citios 
or ('COllOlllic inter('Sts. As loug as ours is a repre-
sentative fonn of governme11t, a11d our legislatures 
arc thos<' instruments of gov<'rnment elected directly 
Ly and dir<'ctly representative of the people, the 
right to elect kgislators in a free and unimpaired 
fashion is a lwdrol'k of our political system.'' Reyn-
olds \". Sims, 377 l'. S. ,>33, 5u2 (H)o4) ( Warren, 
C. J.). 
The present caf'<' drawi; thesP two means of achieving 
au <'ffective. rcpresP11tativP political syst<'.111 illto apparent 
coi1ftict. The p<'titio11<'r stated 011 oath that he is with-
out assets or income and cannot pay the $70Ui0 filing 
fee although he is otherwise legally <'ligible to b<:' a candi-
date OJI the prilllary ballot. 1:1ince his affidavit of iudi-
gency stat<'s that he has 110 resources and earned no 
income whatPver i11 Hl72. it would appear that he would 
make tlw sa111e clai1n wlwther the filing fcp had bePn fixed 
at $1.00. $100.00, or $700.00. The State accepts this as 
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the ballot from being overwhelmed with frivolous or non .. 
serious candidates, arguing that as to indigents the filing 
fee is not intended as a test of his pocketbook but the 
extent of his political support and hence the seriousness 
of his candidacy. 
In Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) 4 we recog-
nized that the State's ·· interest in keeping its ballots 
within (manageable, understandable limits is of the 
highest rder. 405' U. S., at 144-145. -The Supreme 
d"ourt of California has noted that 
"The role of the primary electioh process in Cali-
fornia is underscore<l by its importance as a com-
ponent of the total electoral process and its special 
function to assure that fragmentation of voter choice 
is minimized. That function is served, not frus-
trated, by a procedure that tends to regulate the 
filing of frivolous candidates. A procedure inviting 
or permitting every citizel1 to present himself to the 
voters on the ballot without son).e means of measur-
ing the seriousness of the desire and motivation 
would make rational voter choices more difficult 
because of the size of the ballot and hence tend to 
impede the electoral process. . That no device can 
be conjured to eliminate every frivolous candidacy 
does not undermine the state's effort to eliminate as 
4 Bullock, of rour,;e, doe,; not completely rrsolve the present attack 
upon the California election statutes because it involved filing fees 
that wt>rr so patently exclusionary as to violate rven traditional 
equal protection notion,; of reasonablene~s . Cf. Rosario v. Rocke-
feller, 410 U. S. 752, 760 (197:3); Ja'mes v. Strange , 407 ll . S. 128 ; 
Rinaldi v. Yeager. 384 U. S. 305. Uuder attack in Bullock was a 
Texas :,;ta tute 1 hat rrquired eandida t cs to pay a flat fee of fifty 
dollars plus thrir pro rnta :,;hare of the rosts of the Plection in order 
to g<'t on thr primary ballot. C. 492, § 186 (1951) Tex. Laws ll68-
1169 (Trx. Election Code Art. 1:3.07 (Supp. 1971 ). The assessment 
of co~ts involved :,Um8 a~ high a~ $8,900. 
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inany such as possible." In re McGee, 36 Cal. 2d 
592, 226 P. 2d - (1951). 
This legitimate state interest, however, must be 
achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unneces-
sarily burden either a minority party's or an individual 
candidate's equally important interest in the continued 
availability of political opportunity. The interests 
involved are not merely those of parties or individual 
candidates; the voters can assert their preferences only 
through candidates or parties or both and it is this broad 
interest that must be weighed in the balance. The right 
of a party or an individual to a place on a ballot is 
entitled to protection and is intertwined with the rights 
rof voters. 
"The right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote· 
may be cast only for one of two parties at a time-
when other parties are clamoring for a place 011 the· 
ballot." 1Yilliarns v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30' 
( 1968). 
This must also mean that the right to vote is "heavily 
burdened" if that vote may be ca'st only for one of two 
candidates in a primary election 'at a time when other 
candidates are clamoring for a i)lace on the ballot. J t 
is to be expected that a voter hopes to find on the ballot 
a candidate who comes near to reflecting his policy pref-
erences on contemporary issues. This does not mean 
every voter can be assured that a candidate to his liking 
will he on the ballot, but the process of qualifying candi-
dates for a place on the ballot may not constitutionally 
be solely measured in dollars. 
In Bullock, supra, we expressly rejected the validity of' 
·filing fees as the sole means of determining a candidate's 
·"seriousness": 
"To say that the filing fee requirement tends to limit 
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enough. There may ·well be some ratio11al relation .. 
ship between a candidate's willingness to pay a filing 
fee and the seriousness with which he takes his can-
didacy. [ footnote omitted] but the candidates in this 
case affirmatively alleged that they were unable, not 
simply unwilling, to pay the assessed fees and there 
was no contrary evidence, It is uncontested that 
the filing fees exclude legitimate as well as frivolous 
candidates . . . . If the Texas fee requirement is 
intended to regulat<> the ballot by weeding out 
spurious candidates. it is extraordinarily ill-fitted to 
that goal; [footnote omittedl other means to protect 
those valid interests are available." 405 U. S., at 
145-146. 
Filing fees, however large, do not, in and of themselves, 
test the genuineness of a candidacy or the extent of the 
voter support of an aspirant for public office. A large 
filing fee may serve the legitimate function of keeping 
ballots manageablerfUt standi11g alone it is not a certain 
test of whether the candidacy is serious or spurious. A 
wealthy candidate with not the remotest chance of elec-
tion may secure a place on the ballot by writing a check. 
Merchants and other entrepreneurs have been kllown to 
run for public office simply to make their names known 
to the public. We have also noted that prohibitive filing 
fees. such as those in Bullock can effectively exclude 
serious candidates. Conversely, if the filing fee is more 
moderate. as here, inpecunious but sincere candidates 
may be prevented from running. Even in this day of 
high budget political campaigns some candidates have 
demonstrated that direct contact with thousands of 
voters by "walking tours" is a route to success. What- "7 
ever may be the political mood at any given time, our 
tradition has been one of hospitality toward -al candi-. ) 
' ' 
71-6852-0PIKION 
LllHTN v. PA~ISH 
'dates without regard to their c•conornic status. Cf. 
Thomas v. Mims, 817 Supp. 17D (i--,0 Ala. Hl70). 
The exclusionary nature of th<· California system is 
compoumled by the> abst•nc(' of any alternative mealls of 
gaining accc>ss to the ballot. As we have 11otc>d. tlw pay-
ment of a fpp is an absulutr not an alt('I'llative condition, 
and failurf' to n1ef't it is a disqualificatio11 fro111 ru11ni11g 
for oflic<'. Thus. California has chosen to achieve the 
legitimatE· i11tcrest of 111a111taini11g the integrity of elec-
tions by means which operate to excludt• poor but poten~ 
tially serious ca1Hlidates from the ballot without provid-
ing them ,Yith any alternative m<•ans of com.ing befon~ 
the voters. f-;d<'ctio11 of candidates solely 011 tlw basis 
of ability to pay a fixC>d fili11g foe without providing any 
altrrnatiw means is not rPasonably necessary to the 
acomplishrncnt of the ~tatP's leg)t1111at<' electio11 interests. 
Accordingly, we hold that in the absenc<' of rPasonable 
alternative means of ballot access. a State may not1 
consistent. with Pqual protection requirements. impose 
candidate filing fres. 
In so holding. ,v<> note that tlwre are obviou::; and well 
known nwans of tPsti 11g tlw "seriousness" of a candidacy 
which do not m<>asure the probability of attracting 
significant voter support solely by the llt-'Utral fact of 
payment of a filing ft'l'. States may, for Pxample. impose 
on minor political parties the burden of demo11strating 
the cxisteuce of voter support by requiring such parties 
to file 1wtitious for a placr~ 011 the ballot sigllecl by a 
percentage of those who voted in a prior election. Hee 
American Porty of 'l'e.ras ,·. White, ~o. 72-887 (decide({ 
March.) Hl74). i-iimilarly. a calldidat<-> who establishe'8 
that he cannot pay the fili11g foe required for a place on 
the primary ballot rnay be• re>quin--d to demonstrate the 
"scrious11c>ss'' of his candidacy by persuading a substan-
tial number of voters. to sign a pPtition in h.is behalf.. 
10 
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The point, of course, is that ballot access must be genu-
inely open to all ubject to reasonable requirements. 
Jennes v. Fortson, 402 U. S. 431 , 439 (1971) . Cali-
fornia's present system has not met this standard. 
Reversed and remanded for further consideration not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
' I 
.§1tprtntt Q}irn:rt af ttrr 'Jfutitc?I ~tafta 
'lll,tl.'llfittgfo1t, JO. cq. 211.5,1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
March 8, 1974 
/ 
Re: No. 71-6852 - Lubin v. Panish 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 






CHAM BERS OF 
JU S TI CE P OTTER S T EWART 
~ltµrtttte QJcurt cf tlr t ~nit ch ~tntcs 
~ 1tsl7ington, ~. QJ. 211,5}1,~ 
March 8, 1974 




My view in this case would require a slightly 
narrower holding than that stated in your circulation of 
yesterday. Specifically, I would change the final sen-
tence of the first full paragraph on page 9 along the 
following lines: 
Accordingly, we hold that in the absence 
of reasonable alternative means of ballot 
access, a State may not, consistent with 
the Constitution, impose upon an indigent 
a filing fee requirement which, by definition, 
he cannot possibly satisfy. Cf. Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371. 
If this view is not acceptable to you and/ or to a majority 
of the Brethren, I shall simply file a concurring statement 
along these lines. 
I have one other problem with your circulation --
a very minor one. Since I do not think that "reasonable-
ness" is an appropriate measure of validity under the Equal 
Protection Clause, and because that word is for me too rem-
iniscent of old-fashioned substantive due process, I would 
change the closing words of the first sentence of footnote 4 
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.. . so patently exclusionary as to violate 
even traditional concepts of equal protection 





The Chief Justice 




March 11, 1974 
No. 71-6852 Lubin v. Panish 
Dear Chief: 
I am certainly with you in the result, and also most of your 
opinion circulated March 7. 
It does seem to me, however, that the opinion would be 
strengthened by greater emphasis on the importance - not merely 
the legitimacy - of the state interests involved. Speaking broadly, 
the great sttength of democracy in America (certainly until recently) 
has been the predominance of the two party system. The fragmenta-
tion of political parties has almost destroyed the capacity of many 
democracies to govern responsibly. The current impass and 
stagnation in Italy is one conspicuous example. France has been 
severely weakened by a similar problem. Some of this has now 
cropped up in England, and the pattern in many of the other smaller, 
so-called democracies is of "coalition government" too weak and 
irresponsible to govern effectively. In the end, a rudderless democracy 
will become a totalitarian state. 
A second, and related interest of genuine significance, is 
what you have in mind by use of the term "manageable ballot". This 
means, for me, a ballot which is not so cluttered with the names of 
unlmown and non-entity candidates as to be unintelligible to the average 
voter. If it becomes too easy for a candidate or a party to obtain a 
place on the ballot, rational choice by the public will be impossible. 
This is a sound reason for requiring a meaningful showing of voter 
interest and support before one is allowed a ballot position. Small 
filing fees are inefficacious in furthering this interest. 
If you agree generally with what I have said, perhaps - before 








that emphasize more sharply these two related but quite fundamental 
state interests. I am not suggesting any major revision, but rather 
language changes at such places as you think appropriate. Perhaps a 
footncte also could be added that emphasizes the virtues of our tradition 
and history of party responsibility and the dangers of losing this 
essential quality if multiple weak parties are allowed to infiltrate 
the system - as in the countries mentioned above. 
The next case we are likely to have presented here will involve 
an attack on the requirement of substantial voter interest and support, 
evidenced by petitions, signatures or attendance at conventions. I hope 
your opinion will make clear that evidence of substantial support is a 
valid and legitimate requirement. 
f. .,; 
;i.,14-; l 1 
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.. ~ . To: The Cllicf Just-ice 
Mr. Justice Dougla5 
Mr. Ji;.,tlce Brennan 
Mr. Justice SvtV1.r·t 
Mr, Just ice \/,.ii. to 
ln DIUJ'T 
Mr. Justice har~1 ~l l 
Mr, Justice Powel 1 ~ 
Mr. Justice Renr 41 st 
SUPREME COURT 01f THE UNITEif~ATES" 
Ciroulatt.J: 
No. 71- 6852 




Hecorrlcr. Cou11ty of 
Lo::: Allg('\('H. 
Recirculated: 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia. 
fl\Tnreh --, 19741 
M1e . .Jt 'wnc•: BLACKMUN. co1wuning in 1,art. 
For JUC', th<' rliffi{'ulty with thC' ( 'alifornia <'lt:>ction sys-
tem is thC' abseil<'<' of a realistic alternative access to the 
ballot for the candidate whos<> indigen{'y rend<'rs it im-
possible• for him to pay the prescribed filing fN'. 
I would regard a writ<'-ill pro{'edure. frpe of f<'C', as an 
acceptabk alt<>rnatiV<'. Prior to HlH8, Califomia allowed 
this. and wtitf'-i11 votes wen' C\OU11t,ed , although no prior 
fee had been paid. But th<' prior fep l'('quirernent for 
the writc•-in candidate' wa~ i11corporatt'd into the State's 
Election Code in that year, Laws H)G8, c. 79. ~ 3. and 
is now ~ 18603 (b) of the Code', Tt is that addition. by 
amendment, that servrs to deny the petitiouer the equal 
protection guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Section 18603 ( b) appears to be severable. See 
Frost ,·. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U. R. 515, 525-526 
(1929); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 341-342 (1921). 
The Code itself provides for sevnability. ~ 48. 
I would hold that the California e]('ction statutes are 
unconstitutional insofar as they presently d<'ny access to 
the ballot. If ~ 186Cla ( b) were to he Ftricken. the Code, 
as before, would permit write-in ac{'ess with no prior fee. 
The presence of that alternative would then sC'rw all 
.n, J 
71- fo,.'i:!- ( '( )\'( 'l 'H 
J.l'BI\ ,· . l'.\\'l:·m 
that is d(•111a11d,•d hy th<· I•:qual Pl'ott•ctiun ( 'hlUHl'. I , 
tlwrdor<'. joi11 tht' Court i11 t'C'\'<'rsi11g tlw unlt-•r uf the 
:-iupre,11<' Court of California dP11yi11g pPtitio11<·l'·~ 1wtitio11 




.®ttµ-rrmc QJ.om·t i1f tlrc ';lllnitch .§taf:tt1 
~11WI1ingtan, J. QJ. 2rt.?n~ 
JU ST ICE WM . J . BFIENNAN.JR. 
March 12, 1974 
RE: No. 71-6852 Lubin v. Panish 
Dear Chief: 
I agree with Potter's suggestions in his note to 
you of March 8. May I add another? Would you consider 
deleting the sentence at the top of page 5 - 11 Although 
there is no explicit provision for a right to vote with-
in the text of the Constitution itself. 11 As I think you 
know, I have the view that that protection is found in 
the First Amendment. I think the deletion may be made 
without interrupting the flow of the opinion. If you 
decide to make Potter's changes and the deletion I sug-
gest, I am happy to join the opinion. Otherwise, 
would you please record me at the foot of the opinion 
as concurring in the result. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
/ 









.:§u.p-rrmt QJ01trt of tlft ~nitth .:§tctfrg 
~a$frittgfott, ~- QJ. 20p'1;J 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
March 13, 1974 
I 
I 
Re: No. 71-6852 - Lubin v. Panish 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me in your concurring opinion. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun , 





.:§uµumi- QJamt ttf tlrr J.lni.tdt .:§tutca 
)tla$lrhtl1ht1t, p. <.q. 2lrp)12 
CIIAMOrRS or 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS i,, .. 1,,..1, 1/1 1cv_r), . ,. J\.~...,. V.1.J ~ ' • ..,,- I • 
71-6,'l)2 L11bi n v. Po.nlr,h ·---·----' ----·- --··------·· 
Dea· Chief : 
Steuart in his iremo to you of Vie .. rch 8, 
197)1. c .. nri the P0.c.U·L,i0nal o!1c ra.i:::e,l.. i.w 
13ill Dremmn ln hin memo to yon ot Hcrd1 
12, 197)1 state junt a.l>out rw v.iewn; ::1nd 
if ~,ou felt free to rev j r;c you1· cnx·1:i (:r 
hqri:-iy ~o jo:i.n yo"Lix or,in.i.on. 
Will.i.m.1 o. Dm c;J.~:c. 
'.i:lle Cilicf J'u:.:t.i C<' 
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CHAM91!:RS 0,-
THE CHIEF' JUSTICE 
,jnp:rmu <l}ourt of tlf t :Juittb .itatt• 
lfultin¼lhtn, Jl. <q. 20~~, 
March 14, 1974 
Re: No. 71 - 6852 - Lubin v. Panish 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
A second draft of the above will be in your hands soon. 
It will (?) satisfy almost everyone. 
Reg?); 
j)Ullrrntt <qcttrt of tqe ~ttittlt j)tatts-
Jln¼'fltmgtttn. ~. QJ. 2llffe'-l~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS March 20, 197!1-
Dear Chief: 
In 71-6852 , Lubin v. Panish :please 
join me in your circulation of I•:arch 19, 
1974. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
WiD_iam O. Douglas 
/ 
; 
_ju.µ:re1nc {q01trl cf tlrc J.;111fhh ,§tufl'g 
'JM'aulyhighrn, i!). <q. 20bJJ1.;:t 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
March 20, 1974 
RE: No. 71-6852 Lubin v. Panish 
Dear Chief: 
I agree with your circulation of 
March 19 in the above case. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMl!IERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF' JUSTICE 
Re: 
,iu.pumt <lfourl of tltt ~b .jtatt• 
Jhtalfinghtu. J. QJ. 21lffe'*t1 
March 21, 1974 
No. 71-6852 - Lubin v. Panis h 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Since I sent the second draft of the opinion in the above 
case, I have discovered that there is a case pending in at least 
one state that involves possible constitutional challenges to a 
ballot which does not rotate the names of the candidates $iving 
each one an equal chance to be listed first. In view of this and 
other related considerations, I think the reference to that sub-
ject should be deleted from footnote 5 on pages 10 and 11 so that 
the .following language would be stricken from the .footnote: 
"There is strong evidence, for example, that 
a candidate's chances of victory are significantly 
affected by the position his name occupies on the 
ballot. See Note, California Ballot Position 
Statutes: An Unconstitutional Advantage to Incum-
bents, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 365 (1972). That study 
concluded that the candidate whose name appears 
first on the ballot is the beneficiary o.f a substan-
tial positional advantage and that 'one can attribute 
at least a five percent increase in the first listed 
candidate's vote total to a positional basis.' It 
would reasonably follow that a candidate whose 
nam.e appears anywhere on the ballot has a signifi-
cant advantage over a candidate who must depend 
on write-in votes. 11 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.§iqri-tmt <!Jou.rt of tfyt ~ttittb .§tatta 
'J)'aG!yingtott. t{l. QJ. 2llffeJ~~ 
March 21, 1974 
71-6852 - Lubin v. Panish 
Dear Chief, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
.~ .. ~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.®1tt1ttltU' QJoud cf tltt 'Jlfoibb $,taua 
1Dai.lJrington, W. QJ. 20~'1~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 21, 197 4 
Re: No. 71-6852 -- Lubin v. Panish 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 







March 21, 1974 
No. 71-6852 Lubin v. Panish 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
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